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¶1 This paper seeks to provide an analytical framework for designing more effective 
laws against human trafficking.  The United Kingdom will be used as a case study to 
identify specific changes to the sentencing provisions of anti-trafficking legislation that 
must be made in order to achieve a more effective response to human trafficking and 
other forms of slavery in the world today.  First, economic penalties for human 
trafficking offences must be elevated to a level that effectively inverts the high profit, low 
risk business profile that fuels demand among offenders to acquire and exploit trafficked 
slaves.  Second, trafficking laws should be enforced with more proactive and well-
resourced law enforcement investigations and interventions.  Third, elevated human 
rights protections for survivors must be achieved, particularly as relates to pursuing 
prosecution of offenders.  The European Court of Human Rights’ decision in Rantsev v. 
Cyprus and Russia on January 7, 2010 heightened the importance of these measures.  The 
case established, inter alia, that human trafficking is a violation of Article 4 of the 
European Convention on Human Rights, and that Member States are required to meet 
certain positive and procedural obligations to provide effective mechanisms to protect 
individuals against human trafficking, investigate such crimes, and prosecute and punish 
the offenders. 
¶2 This paper commences with a discussion of the Rantsev case, followed by a brief 
outline of the general nature and purpose of criminal punishment, with a focus on the 
importance of deterrent and retributive aspects of penalizing crimes such as human 
trafficking.  The evolution of jurisprudence in the United Kingdom on human trafficking 
crimes is examined next, followed by an explanation of how economic analysis and the 
author’s concept of ‘Exploitation Value’ in particular can guide this evolution towards 
the design of more effective anti-trafficking laws.  Finally, specific recommendations on 
how to design such laws, as well as discussion of the roles of law enforcement and 
survivor protection in combating human trafficking, will be provided.   
 
                                                 
* Fellow on Human Trafficking, Harvard University, Kennedy School of Government, author, SEX 
TRAFFICKING: INSIDE THE BUSINESS OF MODERN SLAVERY (2009), Masters in Business Administration 
Columbia University, Graduate Diploma in Law BPP Law School (UK), LLM Candidate College of Law 
(UK), Bachelors of Arts Duke University. 
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II. RANTSEV V CYPRUS AND RUSSIA 
¶3 In Rantsev v. Cyprus and Russia,1 a historic first judgment concerning transnational 
human trafficking in Europe, the European Court of Human Rights (“Eur. Ct. H.R.”)2 
found violations of Articles 2, 4, and 5 of the European Convention on Human Rights 
(“ECHR”)3 in relation to Cyprus and Article 4 of the Convention in relation of Russia.4  
The January 7, 2010 judgment established for the first time that human trafficking is a 
violation of Article 4 of the ECHR, and that Member States (such as the United 
Kingdom)5 are required to meet certain positive and procedural obligations to provide 
effective mechanisms to protect individuals against human trafficking, investigate such 
crimes, and prosecute and punish the offenders.6 
¶4 This landmark case was brought by the father of a young Russian woman, Oxana 
Rantsev, who was trafficked from Russia to Cyprus under the false pretense of working 
as a dancer in a cabaret club, forced into prostitution, and found dead on the street a few 
weeks later, on March 28, 2001.7  In claiming violations of Articles 2, 3, 4, 5, and 8 of the 
ECHR,8 Mr. Rantsev argued that there was no adequate investigation into the 
                                                 
1 Rantsev v. Cyprus and Russia, App. No. 25965/04, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2010) available at 
http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/view.asp?item=1&portal=hbkm&action=html&source=tkp&highlight=25
965/04&sessionid=66832565&skin=hudoc-en. 
2 The European Court of Human Rights (Eur. Ct. H.R.) is an international judicial body established under 
the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) to monitor adherence to the principles of the ECHR 
by Member States. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 
1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter European Convention on Human Rights].  Located in Strasbourg, 
France, it is a permanent court with its own judges and rules of procedure. See id.; EUROPEAN COURT OF 
HUMAN RIGHTS, THE ECHR IN 50 QUESTIONS, http://www.echr.coe.int/NR/rdonlyres/5C53ADA4-80F8-
42CB-B8BD-CBBB781F42C8/0/FAQ_ENG_A4.pdf (last visited Feb. 20, 2011) (describing court 
composition, procedure, decisions, activity, future, and location). 
3 See European Convention on Human Rights, supra note 2, arts. 2, 4-5. The ECHR was formerly called 
the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.  It was adopted by the 
Council of Europe, in Strasbourg.  At present, there are 47 Member States of the ECHR, encompassing a 
population exceeding 800 million people. EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS, EUROPEAN COURT OF 
HUMAN RIGHTS IN BRIEF (2009), http://www.echr.coe.int/NR/rdonlyres/DF074FE4-96C2-4384-BFF6-
404AAF5BC585/0/Brochure_EN_Portes_ouvertes.pdf.    
4 See European Convention on Human Rights, supra note 2, art. 4; Rantsev, App. No. 25965/04, Eur. Ct. 
H.R. (2010) (establishing human trafficking as a violation of the European Convention on Human Rights). 
5 The United Kingdom is a Member State of the ECHR and was one of the earliest signatories to the 
Convention, having ratified it on November 4, 1950; however, it was not until the passage of the Human 
Rights Act 1998 (HRA) that the doctrines of the Convention were given effect in UK domestic law. See 
AILEEN KAVANAGH, CONSTITUTIONAL REVIEW UNDER THE UK HUMAN RIGHTS ACT 1-5, 281-93 (2009) 
(discussing historical context and providing detailed analysis of courts under HRA).   
6 See Rantsev, App. No. 25965/04, Eur. Ct. H.R.  ¶¶ 8, 11 (2010) (finding human trafficking a violation of 
art. 4 of ECHR and identifying positive and procedural obligations).  While the respondent in many claims 
under the ECHR is the State or its agents, there can also be situations in which the actual violating activity 
is not carried out by the State or its agents.  In such cases, the State may face similar liability if its domestic 
laws do not effectively prohibit, deter, or punish the violation in question. Id. ¶¶ 11, 180, 182, 187 
(discussing procedural requirements and failure to protect resulting in violation).  Such “positive 
obligations” are limited to very specific categories of rights under the ECHR, such as Article 4, and they 
are also subject to the principle of proportionality, as set down in the case of Soering v. United Kingdom, in 
which the Eur. Ct. H.R. stated: “inherent in the whole of the Convention is a search for a fair balance 
between the demands of the general interest of the community and the requirements of the protection of the 
individuals’ fundamental rights.” Soering, App. No. 14038/88, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A), ¶ 89 (1989).   
7 See Rantsev, App. No. 25965/04, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 187 (2010). 
8 The rights provided by these Articles are: the right to life, a prohibition of torture, a prohibition of slavery 
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circumstances surrounding his daughter’s death, that his daughter was inadequately 
protected by police in Cyprus while she was still alive, and that authorities completely 
failed to punish the individuals responsible for trafficking her, coercing her into 
commercial sex work, and exposing her to the ill treatment that ultimately led to her 
death.9 
¶5 Of most interest to this paper is the jurisprudence relating to violations of Article 4: 
 No one shall be held in slavery or servitude. 
 No one shall be required to perform forced or compulsory labour.10   
Two vital points were made by the Court in adjudicating the Article 4 claim.  The first 
point establishes human trafficking as a form of modern-day slavery that violates Article 
4 of the ECHR.11  The second stipulates that under Article 4, certain positive and 
procedural obligations accrue to signatories of the Convention, such that they must 
provide effective mechanisms to protect individuals against human trafficking, investigate 
such crimes, and prosecute and punish the offenders.12 
¶6 For many years, the Court paid relatively little attention to Article 4, with the most 
important decision prior to Rantsev being that of Siliadin v. France in 2005.13  That case 
was criticized for its narrow construal of the definition of slavery under Article 4.   The 
Court in Siliadin highlighted the importance of a “genuine right of legal ownership” to 
establish enslavement under Article 4 by relying primarily upon the definition of 
“slavery” in the Slavery Convention 1926, that is, “the status or condition of a person 
over whom any or all of the powers attaching to the right of ownership are exercised.”14  
Criticism was considerable because there had already been movement in the EU towards 
the legal recognition of human trafficking as a form of slavery, particularly where 
control, intimidation, and severe power imbalances lead to slavery-like exploitation 
despite the fact that there may not be actual rights of ownership involved.15 In Ranstsev, 
the Court for the first time clearly acknowledged new and evolving forms of slavery.  On 
human trafficking, it stated: “The Court considers that trafficking in human beings, by its 
very nature and aim of exploitation, is based on the exercise of powers attaching to the 
right of ownership.  It treats human beings as commodities to be bought and sold and put 
                                                                                                                                                 
and forced labour, the right to liberty and security, and the right to respect for private and family life. 
European Convention on Human Rights, supra note 2, arts. 2-5, 8.  Note, only articles 3 and 4 confer 
absolute rights under the ECHR.  
9 See Rantsev, App. No. 25965/04, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 3 (2010) (detailing victim’s father’s allegations). 
10 See supra note 6 and accompanying text (analyzing ECHR article 4 jurisprudence); infra notes 12-23 and 
accompanying text (discussing treatment of ECHR article 4).   
11 See Rantsev, App. No. 25965/04, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 8 (2010). 
12 See id. ¶ 11. 
13 See id. ¶ 8; Siliadin v. France, App. No. 73316/01, 43 Eur. Ct. H.R. 16 (2005). 
14 Siliadin, 43 Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 122; United Nations Slavery Convention art. 1, Sept. 25, 1926, available at 
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/slavery.htm [hereinafter Slavery Convention].  
15 See Prosecutor v. Kunarac, Kovac and Vukovic, Judgment, Case Nos. IT-96-23 & IT-96-23/1 (Int'l Trib. 
for the Prosecution of Pers. Responsible for Serious Violations of Int'l Humanitarian Law Committed in the 
Territory of the Former Yugoslavia since 1991 [hereinafter ICTY], Feb. 22, 2001), available at 
http://www.un.org/icty/ind-e.htm; Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 7(1)(c), July 17, 
1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90 [hereinafter Rome Statute].  
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to forced labour….”16  While the Court was not prepared to define human trafficking as 
slavery, it did establish that human trafficking is a violation of Article 4 of the ECHR: 
There can be no doubt that trafficking threatens the human dignity and 
fundamental freedoms of its victims and cannot be considered compatible 
with a democratic society and the values expounded in the Convention.  In 
view of its obligation to interpret the Convention in light of present-day 
conditions, the Court considers it unnecessary to identify whether the 
treatment about which the applicant complains constitutes “slavery”, 
“servitude” or “forced and compulsory labour.”  Instead, the Court 
concludes that trafficking itself…falls within the scope of Article 4 of the 
Convention.17   
The Court can be criticized for coming short of stating that human trafficking meets the 
definition of slavery set forth in Article 4 of the ECHR.  However, from a practical 
standpoint, it handed a victory to the European, and ultimately global, antislavery 
community in that human trafficking was clearly stated to be a violation of Article 4.18 
¶7 Having so held, the Court elaborated on Convention signatories’ positive and 
procedural obligations under Article 4.  The Court was short on specifics, but it did state 
that Article 4 creates positive obligations to States to provide individuals within their 
jurisdiction with “practical and effective protection against human trafficking,” and to:  
…penalise and prosecute effectively any act aimed at maintaining a person 
in a situation of slavery, servitude or forced or compulsory labour.  In 
order to comply with this obligation, member States are required to put in 
place a legislative and administrative framework to prohibit and punish 
human trafficking.19 
¶8 Procedural obligations under Article 4 also require States to “investigate situations 
of potential trafficking.”20  Such investigations do not require “a complaint from the 
victim or next-of-kin,” and they must be conducted promptly, or urgently in the case of 
removing an individual from an exploitive condition.21  The Court also emphasized that 
given the transnational nature of human trafficking, “…States are also subject to a duty in 
cross-border trafficking cases to cooperate effectively with the relevant authorities of 
other States concerned in the investigation of events which occurred outside their 
territories.”22 
                                                 
16 See Rantsev, App. No. 25965/04, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 281 (2010).  
17 Id. ¶ 282.   
18See id. ¶¶ 200, 282 (noting scarcity of case law interpreting article 4 and finding trafficking a violation 
thereof).  
19 Id. ¶ 285 (emphasis added) (citing Siliadin judgment and reasoning as support for concluding trafficking 
a violation of article 4). 
20 Id. ¶  288.  
21Id. (detailing obligation to investigate and noting essential steps necessary to conduct effective 
investigation). 
22 Id. ¶ 289.  
Vol. 9:2] SIDDHARTH KARA 127 
 
¶9 The scope of actions for meeting these positive and procedural obligations remains 
unclear.  What exactly is required to “provide individuals practical and effective 
protection against human trafficking?” Furthermore, what is necessary to conduct 
investigations that meet the procedural obligations under Article 4?  While these and 
other questions will be touched on in this paper, the focus will be on the methods to 
“penalize and prosecute effectively” human trafficking crimes.  Within this question, the 
focus will be on the penalty aspect of the design of criminal law against such crimes.23  
Of course, much more is required to eradicate human trafficking than just passing laws, 
but this is a vital step.  In order to do so, criminal penalties must be designed with an 
accurate understanding of the motivation and benefit behind the commission of the crime.  
In the case of slavery, the motivation is fundamentally economic, and the economic 
benefits in the modern context, especially with sex trafficking, are immense.       
¶10 There are many forms of slavery and many industries in which slaves are exploited.  
Each variant will demand a slightly different answer to the penalty question.  The 
following analysis will investigate the most profitable form of modern-day slavery: sex 
trafficking.  This analysis will be, to varying degrees, applicable to all other forms of 
human trafficking and modern-day slavery.  A global business and economic analysis of 
the contemporary sex trafficking industry has already been advanced.24  The key thesis of 
that analysis is that the global sex trafficking industry is enormous and pervasive because 
it generates immense profits at almost no real risk.  Indeed, sex trafficking is by far the 
most profitable form of slavery in the world today, perhaps in history.25  Even though 
only approximately 4% of the world’s 30.2 million slaves at the end of 2010 were 
trafficked sex slaves, those same slaves generated approximately 40% of the $96.8 billion 
in profits generated by the exploitation of slaves by slave exploiters during 2010.26  
Consequently, a more effective approach to attack the sex trafficking industry, and to 
varying extents all other forms of slavery, is to erect a system that renders it a low profit, 
high risk business venture.  The seven recommendations I provide in Sex Trafficking27 
are designed to elevate the costs and risks associated with sex trafficking crimes by 
                                                 
23 On this point, the paltry damages of 40,000 Euros levied against Cyprus (for violations of positive and 
procedural obligations) and 2,000 Euros levied against Russia (for violations of procedural obligations) in 
Rantsev hardly provide sufficient motivation for States to take on the added burden and expense of meeting 
even minimally construed meanings of positive and procedural obligations under Article 4 of the ECHR. 
See Rantsev, App. No. 25965/04, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 13(a)-(b) (2010) (awarding non-pecuniary damages).  The 
logic in assessing this level of fines is driven by the fact that the States were not the actual offenders, but 
rather they only violated certain positive and procedural obligations. See SIDDHARTH KARA, SEX 
TRAFFICKING: INSIDE THE BUSINESS OF MODERN SLAVERY 37-41 (2009) (analyzing factors contributing to 
continued growth of sex trafficking). However, economic penalties for such failures must be far more 
significant in order to sufficiently deter States from failing their positive and procedural obligations under 
the ECHR, and also to justify the added expense of meeting those obligations. See id. at 200-16 
(introducing framework for deterrence and, ultimately, abolition).  
24 See KARA, supra note 23, at 1-44 (analyzing supply, demand, profit, risk, and punishment as critical 
factors in global business of sex trafficking). 
25 See id. at 19 and Appendix B (providing profitability of various forms of contemporary slavery); see also 
SIDDARTH KARA, BONDED LABOUR: TACKLING THE BUSINESS OF SLAVERY IN SOUTH ASIA(forthcoming 
2012) (additional detail on historic profitability of slavery). 
26 See KARA, supra note 23 (illustrating data and detailing analysis).  For end of year 2006 data, I calculated 
there were 28.4 million slaves in the world who generated $91.2 billion in profits for their exploiters. See 
KARA, supra note 23. The details of the methodology used to generate these numbers appear in Appendices 
A and B of SEX TRAFFICKING. Id. 
27 See KARA, supra note 23, at 200-19 (discussing seven recommendations and how they are specifically 
designed to eradicate global sex trafficking industry). 
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exploiting vulnerabilities in the industry’s business model and micro-economic 
functioning.28  The following analysis focuses on the final, and perhaps most important of 
the seven interventionist recommendations: elevated economic penalties in the law.   
¶11 Proposals for effective penalties against human trafficking require first an analysis 
of the general nature and purpose of criminal law.  Next, the paper will explore exactly 
what the punishment recommendation means in the context of antislavery law in the UK 
and in other countries, particularly as relates to meeting positive obligations under Article 
4 ECHR.   
III. CRIMINAL LAW IN THE UK 
¶12 The following is intended as a brief overview of the nature and purpose of criminal 
law in the UK common law system, which forms the basis of the legal systems in 
countries possessing at least one-third of the world’s population.29  The deterrent and 
retributive aspects of such law will be of particular importance.   
¶13 Criminal law is generally defined as representing the rules of social control within a 
society.30  In the UK, a more specific definition of criminal law was provided by a 
Wolfenden Committee report in 1957.  According to the Committee, the purpose of 
criminal law was 
…to preserve public order and decency, to protect the citizen from what is 
offensive or injurious, and to provide sufficient safeguards against 
exploitation or corruption of others, particularly those who are specially 
vulnerable because they are young, weak in body or mind or 
inexperienced or in a state of special physical, official or economic 
dependence.31 
Per these terms, criminal law is a reflection of a society's values and morality.  The 
crimes the law seeks to punish are those that contradict the fundamental values upon 
which a society is founded.  Punishments for crimes function as instruments of social 
control by penalizing the offender and by reinforcing the values of a society.  Inquiries 
into the design of criminal law thus relate to the setting forth of those crimes that should 
be punished, and more importantly, what those punishments should be.  As all societies 
have agreed that slavery is a crime that should be punished, this latter element—the 
nature of the punishment—is the focus of this article.  
¶14 There are four primary purposes under which the nature of punishment in criminal 
law is pursued in most common law systems, such as the UK and the U.S.: retribution, 
incapacitation, rehabilitation, and deterrence.32  First, retribution seeks to provide 
                                                 
28 Vulnerabilities in micro-economic functioning of the sex trafficking industry primarily relate to the price 
elasticity of demand for commercial sex services.  See KARA, supra note 23, at 23-37, 200-19 (reviewing 
costs, risks, and vulnerabilities in relation to global industry of sex trafficking). 
29 C.I.A., WORLD FACT BOOK, LEGAL SYSTEM, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-
factbook/fields/2100.html?countryName=&countryCode=&regionCode=p (last visited May 26, 2010) 
(identifying countries with common law system).  
30 See JAMES F. STEPHENS, A HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 9-74 (MacMillan 1883).  
31 THE WOLFENDEN COMMITTEE, REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON HOMOSEXUAL OFFENCES AND 
PROSTITUTION 23 (Stein and Dry, Inc 1963) (1957).   
32 See Albin Eser, The Nature and Rationale of Punishment, Symposium, George Fletcher’s The Grammar 
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punishments because this is what the offender deserves for committing the crime.33  
There is an implicit sense of vengeance constituent to this purpose of punishment: 
[T]he infliction of punishment by law gives definite expression and a 
solemn ratification and justification to the hatred which is excited by the 
commission of the offence…The criminal law thus proceeds upon the 
principle that it is morally right to hate criminals, and it confirms and 
justifies that sentiment by inflicting upon criminals, punishments which 
express it.34 
Another aspect of retribution-based punishment is denunciation.35  The infliction of 
punishment articulates society's disapproval of the offending behavior and asserts the 
values of the society that criminal law is meant to uphold. 36 
¶15 Second, incapacitation seeks to protect society from additional offences committed 
by the offender by incarcerating the individual.37  For crimes focused on economic 
benefit, being incarcerated may often not inhibit the ongoing benefit of the crime, as 
major offenders who head criminal syndicates can often still enjoy the monetary fruits of 
their subordinates’ criminal labor. 
¶16 Third, rehabilitation aims to provide encouragement and assistance to the criminal 
to lead a good, productive, and socially acceptable life upon release from prison or other 
sentence.38 The results of rehabilitative efforts are hotly debated.39  Some argue that there 
is no material difference in recidivism rates between rehabilitative and retributive 
                                                                                                                                                 
of Criminal Law: American, Comparative, International: The Act Requirement, 28 CARDOZO L. REV. 2427 
(2007); STEPHENS, supra note 30 (identifying four principal aims of criminal law).  
33 See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 621 (3d ed. 2006) (defining “retribution”). 
34 STEPHENS, supra note 30, at 81.   
35 See John Bronsteen, Retribution’s Role, 84 IND. L. J. 1129, 1151-52 (discussing utilitarian emphasis on 
denunciation); Ronald J. Rychlak, Society’s Moral Right to Punish: A Further Exploration of the 
Denunciation Theory of Punishment, 65 TUL. L. REV. 299 (1990) (providing in-depth analysis of 
denunciation punishment theory). 
36 See Rychlak, supra note 36, at 332-38 (discussing renunciation theory and analyzing role of pubic in 
criminal law enforcement); Bronsteen, supra note 36 at 1151 (discussing retributive reason for punishment) 
37 See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 346 (3d ed. 2006) (defining “incapacitation”). 
38 Id. at 604 (defining “rehabilitation”). 
39 See, e.g., D.A. Andrews &, James Bonta, Rehabilitating Criminal Justice Policy and Practice, 16 
PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 39, 40-2 (2010) (noting shift in American Justice policy, highlighting focus on 
“get tough” policies without regard to potential for rehabilitation); Michael Tonry, Obsolescence and 
Immanence in Penal Theory and Policy, Symposium, Sentencing: What’s at State for the States?, 105 
COLUM. L. REV. 1233, 1252-54 (2005) (issuing a call to action to develop more humane punishment 
policies including reintegration of rehabilitative aim in policy making); Paul Holland & Wallace J. 
Mlyniec, Whatever Happened to the Right to Treatment?: The Modern Quest for Historical Promise, 68 
TEMP. L. REV. 1791, 1814-5 (1995) (recommending model system of punishment should penalties and 
sanctions with rehabilitative services). But see Russell L. Christopher, Deterring Retributivism: The 
Injustice of “Just” Punishment, 96 NW. U. L. REV. 843, 890-91 (2002) (noting Retributivists’ criticism of 
policy making relying heavily upon potential for rehabilitation); NORVAL MORRIS, THE FUTURE OF 
IMPRISONMENT 24-43 (1974) (questioning soundness of rehabilitation theory); FRANCIS A. ALLEN, THE 
DECLINE OF THE REHABILITATIVE IDEAL (1981) (regarding rehabilitation as an obscure, unobtainable goal 
of punishment).     
130 NORTHWESTERN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS [ 2 0 1 1  
 
punishments, whereas others have argued the opposite.40  In the UK, rehabilitative 
sentences have been increasingly subordinated across the last two decades.41 
¶17 Deterrence-based punishments fall into two broad categories: special deterrence 
(dissuading a specific criminal from committing future crimes) and general deterrence 
(dissuading other individuals from offending by making an example of particular 
offenders).42  Sentences are designed to deter specific criminals from committing the 
same offence in the future, and/or to deter other would-be criminals from committing the 
same offense as the specific offender.  Scholars and practitioners disagree as to the 
effectiveness of both forms of deterrence.  However, one generally accepted point is that 
an offender's perception of the likelihood of punishment serves as a tangible deterrent.43  
If an offender perceives a sufficiently real possibility that he will be arrested and 
convicted of a crime (and the punishment is sufficiently severe), he is less likely to 
commit that crime.  These generalized points on the nature of deterrence were 
summarized in a 1990 report by the UK Home Office: “…it is hard to show any effect 
that one type of sentence is more likely than any other to reduce the likelihood of 
reoffending” but “…the probability of arrest and conviction is likely to deter potential 
offenders.”44  
¶18 Current approaches to criminal law in the UK and many other common law 
countries tend to prioritize retribution and deterrence over rehabilitation, within the limits 
of the principles of proportionality and reasonableness.45  The UK Criminal Justice Act 
2000 specifically states that sentences must be imposed that are "commensurate with the 
seriousness of the offence."46  Interestingly, the Act provides for the departure from the 
principle of proportionality for violent offences and sexual offences.47  A few years later, 
the UK Criminal Justice Act 2003 clearly downgraded proportionality in an effort to 
achieve a greater retributive and deterrent value in the nature of punishments, especially 
for violent and sexual offences, both of which characterize the acts taken against Oxana 
Rantsev and other trafficked sex slaves.  Section 142 of the Act provides: 
(1) Any court dealing with an offender in respect of his offence must have 
regard to the following purposes of sentencing –  
(a) the punishment of offenders 
                                                 
40 ALLEN, supra note 39 (arguing rehabilitative efforts fail to reduce recidivism).  
41 Id. (arguing strongly in favor of rehabilitation as deterrent to future recidivism). 
42 See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 206 (3d ed. 2006) (defining “special deterrence” and “general 
deterrence”). 
43 See, e.g., John Bronsteen, Retribution’s Role, 84 IND. L.J. 1129, 1129, 1132-33 (discussing appropriate 
role of deterrence in punishment and noting debate among punishment theorists); WAYNE R. LAFAVE, 
CRIMINAL LAW § 7.1(c) (54th ed. 2003) (analyzing deterrence theory of punishment among others); 
Christopher, supra note 39, at 948-50 (debating various theoretical perspectives on the effectiveness of 
deterrence).   
44 HOME OFF., U.K., THE SENTENCE OF THE COURT 9 (1990).  
45 HOME AFF. COMMITTEE, HOUSE OF COMMONS, ALTERNATIVES TO PRISON SENTENCES, 1997-8, H.C. § 
B(ii) (analyzing approaches to sentencing in UK and prioritization of retribution and deterrence). 
46 Criminal Justice and Court Services Act, Powers of Criminal Court (Sentencing) Act, 2000, c. 6, 43 § 
80(2)(a) (U.K.).   
47 Id. § 79(2)(b). 
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(b) the reduction of crime (including its reduction by deterrence) 
(c) the reform and rehabilitation of offenders 
(d) the protection of the public, and 
(e) the making of reparation by offenders to persons affected by their 
offences[.]48 
 
¶19 Given these sentencing guidelines in the UK, and given the broader purpose of 
criminal law to exert social control, protect citizens, and assert the values on which a 
society is founded, what then is the most effective way to penalize those who commit 
human trafficking and other slave-related crimes?  Answering these questions requires an 
overview of British antislavery law. 
IV. LEGISLATIVE RESPONSE TO SLAVERY IN THE UK  
¶20 As most students of antislavery history know, the first major antislavery movement 
began when the Society for Effecting the Abolition of the Slave Trade was formed when 
twelve men gathered on May 22, 1787 at 2 George Yard in London.49  Thomas Clarkson, 
William Wilberforce, and ten others agreed on a preposterous mandate – to abolish 
slavery in the British Empire at a time when even the Church of England had slaves.50  
These men campaigned tirelessly against immeasurable odds, covering tens-of-thousands 
of miles by horseback, ship, carriage, and foot to gather the evidence, signatures, and 
other support required to convince the UK Parliament that slavery should be abolished.51  
In 1807 Britain outlawed the trans-Atlantic slave trade with the Slave Trade Act 1807.52  
It took another twenty-six years before Parliament passed the Slavery Abolition Act 
1833, outlawing slavery throughout the majority of the British Empire, with the exception 
of the territories of the East India Company, Ceylon, and St. Helena.53  Only one of the 
original twelve crusaders lived to see that day.54 
¶21 Today, the UK remains very much at the forefront of antislavery policy and 
legislation, most of which relates to the ascent of the post-Cold War phenomenon of 
human trafficking.55  As with many countries, the majority of human trafficking research 
and legislative response in the UK has primarily focused on trafficking for sexual 
exploitation.  Indeed, the UK Home Office estimates that in 2003 “there were up to 4,000 
women in the UK that had been trafficked for sexual exploitation” and “the majority of 
our knowledge regarding the situation in the UK centres on trafficking for the purposes of 
                                                 
48 Criminal Justice Act, 2003, c. 44, § 142(1) (U.K.).  
49 See ADAM HOCHSCHILD, BURY THE CHAINS 3-16 (Houghton Mifflin Harcourt )(2005).   
50 Id.   
51 See generally id.   
52 Act To Prevent the Importation of Slaves, 1807, 46 Geo. 3, c. 52 (Eng.). 
53 See Act for the Abolition of Slavery Throughout the British Colonies, 1833, 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 73. 
54 See HOCHSCHILD, supra note 49, at 299-309.   
55 See KARA, supra note 23, at 1-44 (discussing evolution of human trafficking into a global phenomenon). 
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sexual exploitation . . . ”56 This estimate is conservative, and colleagues in law 
enforcement in the UK have personally indicated to me that the number of sex trafficking 
victims in the UK could be ten times greater.  Trafficked sex slaves suffer extreme levels 
of rape, torture, starvation, and in some cases, murder.  They are coerced to engage in up 
to twenty or more sex acts per day with male clients.  Escape is rarely an option as harm 
is threatened against the slave and against family members back home.  In addition, 
individuals are held captive in a country whose language they may not speak with their 
documents confiscated.  The threat of deportation or abuse by the police further paralyzes 
victims. 
¶22 In the UK, human trafficking crimes are prosecuted by the Crown Prosecution 
Service (“CPS”).57  Prior to 2002, the CPS could only proceed against traffickers by 
using laws criminalizing certain elements of trafficking crimes, such as assault, rape, 
kidnapping, or facilitating illegal entry into the country.  Most provisions utilized in 
prosecutions were found in the Sexual Offences Act 1956, which made it an offence to 
procure a woman to work as a prostitute in the UK;58 to detain a woman against her will 
with the intention that she shall have unlawful sexual intercourse;59 and for a man to live 
off the earnings of prostitution.60  Sections 22 and 24 of the Sexual Offences Act 1956 
carry a maximum sentence of two years imprisonment and section 30 seven years 
imprisonment.61 
¶23 In 2002, the UK Parliament passed the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 
2002, which made it an offence to traffic persons into, within, and out of the UK for the 
purpose of prostitution.62  These provisions were then replaced by sections 57-59 of the 
Sexual Offences Act 2003, which address trafficking into, trafficking within, and 
trafficking out of the UK for sexual exploitation, respectively.  All offences carry a 
maximum prison sentence of fourteen years and/or a fine not exceeding the statutory 
maximum.63   
¶24 Trafficking for non-sexual forms of exploitation has received considerably less 
legislative and prosecutorial attention in the UK.  Such offences are captured by the 
Asylum and Immigration Act 2004.64  The maximum sentence is fourteen years 
imprisonment and/or a fine not exceeding the statutory maximum.65  The proceeds of the 
crimes can be confiscated by the courts under the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002.66 
¶25 There are also several international treaties and protocols relating to forced labor 
and human trafficking to which the UK is signatory, including: 
                                                 
56 HOME OFF. & SCOTTISH EXECUTIVE, U.K., U.K. ACTION PLAN ON TACKLING HUMAN TRAFFICKING 14 
(2007). 
57 See Prosecution of Offences Act, 1985, c. 23 (U.K.) (establishing Crown Prosecution Service). 
58 Sexual Offences Act, 1956, 4 & 5 Eliz. 2, c. 69, § 22(1). 
59 Id. § 24. 
60 Id. § 30.  
61 See id. at §§ 23, 24, 30; Prosecution of Offences Act, supra note 57 and accompanying text (detailing 
sections). 
62 Nationality, Asylum and Immigration Act, 2002, c. 41, § 145 (U.K.). 
63 See Sexual Offences Act, 2003, c. 42 §§ 57(2)(b), 58(2)(b), 59(2)(b) (U.K.). 
64 See Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of Claimants) Act, 2004, c. 19, § 4 (U.K.). 
65 See id. § 4(5)(b).  
66 See Proceeds of Crime Act, 2002, c. 29, Part 2 (U.K.). 
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 Council of Europe Convention on Action against Trafficking in 
Human Beings, 200567 
 United Nations Trafficking Protocol, 200068 
 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination 
against Women, 197969 
 United Nations Supplementary Convention on Slavery, the Slave 
Trade and Institutions and Practices Similar to Slavery, 195670  
 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms, 195071 
 United Nations Slavery Convention, 1926 
 International Labour Organisation Conventions72 
As human trafficking laws in the UK are only a few years old, there have not been a vast 
number of successful prosecutions to date.73  Most prosecutions have related to 
trafficking for sexual exploitation.74  One of the mandates in the 2007 UK Action Plan on 
Tackling Human Trafficking is to keep “the legislation on trafficking under review to 
ensure it continues to provide an effective framework for the prosecution of trafficking 
offences and thereby provides a deterrent.” 75  This mandate echoes the UK Criminal 
Justice Act of 2003’s aim to deter crime.  Thus, if the UK and many other common law 
jurisdictions place a premium on deterrence, and if positive obligations under ECHR’s 
Article 4 require criminal law penalties against human trafficking to be effective, then it 
seems reasonable that achieving greater levels of deterrence against human trafficking 
crimes through, at a minimum, the design of the penalties against the crime would seem a 
logical place to start in order to meet the burden of effectiveness.  With this aim in mind, 
the following review of the UK case law on human trafficking is intended to highlight 
                                                 
67 Eur. Consult. Ass., Council of Eur. Convention on Action against Trafficking in Hum. Beings, Doc. No. 
197 (2005), available at 
http://www.coe.int/T/E/human_rights/trafficking/PDF_Conv_197_Trafficking_E.pdf. 
68 United Nations Trafficking Protocol, G.A. Res. 25/50, U.N. Doc. A/RES/55/25  
(Nov. 10, 2000), available at 
http://www.uncjin.org/Documents/Conventions/dcatoc/final_documents_2/convention_%20traff_eng.pdf. 
69 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, G.A. Res.  34/180, U.N. 
Doc. A/RES/34/180 (Dec. 18, 1979), available at 
http://untreaty.un.org/cod/avl/ha/cedaw/cedaw.htmlhttp://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/text/econv
ention.htm. 
70 United Nations Supplementary Convention on Slavery, Slave Trade and Institutions and Practices 
Similar to Slavery, April 30, 1957, 226 U.N.T.S. 3, available at 
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/slavetrade.htm. 
71 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Sept. 3, 1953, 213 U.N.T.S. 
222, available at http://conventions.coe.int/treaty/en/treaties/html/005.htm. 
72 See, e.g., Int’l Lab. Org. (ILO), Forced Labour Convention, at C29 (June 28, 1930), available at 
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3ddb621f2a.html; see generally Database of Int’l Lab. Standards, 
ILOLEX, available at http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/english/convdisp1.htm. 
73 See compare R. v. Maka, [2005] EWCA (Crim) 3365 (U.K.) (upholding sentence despite severity, noting 
modern regulations meant to both punish and deter); R .v. Roci, Ismailaj, [2005] EWCA (Crim) 3404 
(U.K.) (involving sentence for trafficking Lithuanian girls), with R. v. Ramaj, [2006] EWCA (Crim) 448 
(U.K.) (holding sentence far too long, reasoning that Roci and Maka involved trafficking of much greater 
severity). 
74 See, e.g., R. v. Maka, [2005] EWCA (Crim) 3365 (U.K.); R. v. Plakici, [2004] EWCA (Crim) 1275 
(U.K.); A.T. v. Dulghieru, [2009] EWHC 225 (U.K.).  
75 HOME OFF. & SCOTTISH EXECUTIVE, supra note 56, at 34 (emphasis added). 
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weaknesses of such prosecutions and penalties as a means to formulating more effective 
ways of deterring, if not virtually abolishing, these crimes. 
V. REVIEW OF SELECT UK SEX TRAFFICKING CASE LAW 
¶26 Having reviewed most of the cases that have been prosecuted relating to human 
trafficking since the passage of the Sexual Offences Act 2003, the following five cases 
are identified as representing the essential facets of the crimes and the nature of the 
prosecutions.  As highlighted in the previous paragraph, the application of law as a 
deterrent to the crime of human trafficking has been a chief focus in the adjudication of 
these cases.   
A. Attorney-General's Reference no. 6 of 2004 (R v. Plakici) 
¶27 R v. Plakici was the first major case that involved the coercion of multiple 
trafficking victims into commercial sexual exploitation in the UK.76  The defendant was a 
twenty-six year old Albanian-born British citizen who played a key role in a trafficking 
operation that trafficked young women from Romania and Moldova to work in British 
cities as prostitutes.77  The victims were recruited through false employment 
opportunities, but upon arrival they were raped, starved, and physically tortured.78  Some 
were exploited by those who trafficked them; others were sold to other pimps for sums 
ranging from £5,000 to £7,00079 ($8,200 to $11,480).80  There were seven female victims 
in total, ranging from ages sixteen to twenty-four.81  The defendant enjoyed profits of at 
least £204,396 ($308,638)82 from this exploitation, from the years 1999 to 2002.83 
¶28 Because this case commenced before the implementation of the Nationality, 
Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 and Sexual Offences Act 2003, it exemplifies the way 
traffickers were previously charged under offences constituent to a trafficking operation, 
including kidnapping, procuring a minor to have unlawful sexual intercourse, and 
assisting unlawful immigration. The defendant pleaded guilty to the lesser charges and 
was convicted of the others.84  He was sentenced to ten years in prison; this increased to 
twenty-three years on appeal.85  In more than doubling Plakici's sentence, Latham LJ 
stated that the ten year sentence “in [no] way adequately reflects the criminality in this 
case or the need for a substantial and deterrent sentence[.]”86  The Lord Justice Latham 
did not impose damages.87 
                                                 
76 See Plakici, [2004] EWCA (Crim) 1275 (U.K.) (appeal taken from Eng.).  
77 See id. ¶¶ 4, 9, 13, 172-75 (detailing defendant background and victims of crimes).  
78 See id. ¶¶ 6, 9, 23-4. 
79 See id. ¶¶ 12-15 (detailing exploitation of those living with defendant and those sold to pimps). 
80 Calculated based on the average 1999 dollar equivalent of 1.62. 
81 See Plakici, [2004] EWCA (Crim) 1275, [4], [9], [13]-[15] (U.K.) (describing victims and identifying 
age). 
82 Calculated based on the average 1999-2002 dollar equivalent of 1.51. 
83 Plakici, [2004] EWCA (Crim) 1275, [16] (U.K.) (noting investigation uncovered at least £204,396 
traceable to illegal exploitation, describing defendant’s lavish lifestyle). 
84 Id. ¶  4-5. 
85 Id. ¶ 30 (calculating consecutive sentence). 
86 Id. ¶ 25 (emphasis added). 
87 See id. ¶ 32 (imposing only a sentence and no damages). 
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B. R v. Maka 
¶29 R v. Maka was the first case to arise under the new anti-trafficking legislation in the 
Sexual Offences Act 2003.88  The defendants were part of a professional network of 
traffickers, and were convicted under sections 57 and 58 of the Sexual Offences Act 
2003.89  There was only one victim in this case, a fifteen-year-old girl from Lithuania.90  
She was tricked into traveling to the UK under a false employment opportunity.91  When 
she arrived in the UK on July 12, 2004, her passport was confiscated and she was held 
captive at a hotel in London.92  She was sold to a trafficker for £4,000 ($7,360),93 raped 
by the men holding her captive on a number of occasions, and then forced into 
prostitution in a Birmingham brothel.94  After several months, the young girl was then 
sold to another set of male exploiters for £3,00095 ($5,520).96  She attempted to escape 
from these third exploiters, but she was recaptured and punished with physical torture and 
rape.97  She was sold again and exploited in another brothel.98  After conviction, the 
defendants were sentenced to a prison term of eighteen years (nine years for each count 
under sections 57 and 58).99  The defendants appealed the sentence as being too severe 
given the relatively short duration of exploitation of the victim (a few months), but the 
Court dismissed the appeal, stating, “the total sentence…was appropriately severe, 
because deterrence…is a highly material consideration.”100   Damages were not 
imposed.101 
C. R v. Roci and Ismailaj 
¶30 This case involved the trafficking of four Lithuanian women into the UK between 
November 2003 and September 2004 for the purpose of commercial sexual 
exploitation.102  R v. Roci is notable as the first case that resulted from proactive police 
investigation in the UK into possible sex trafficking victims in red light areas.103  Such 
investigation involved following tips of potential prostitution, human and electronic 
surveillance, and ultimately a raid on the offending establishment.104  One defendant was 
acquitted, one was convicted, and two pleaded guilty under sections 57 and 58 of the 
                                                 
88 See Maka, [2005] EWCA (Crim) 3365 (U.K.) (appeal taken from Eng.) (identifying violations of the 
Sexual Offences Act, 2003). 
89 Sexual Offences Act, 2003, c. 42, §§ 57(1), 58(1) (U.K.); see Maka, [2005] EWCA (Crim) 3365, [1]-[5] 
(U.K.) (detailing sophistication of organisation and complexity of criminal network). 
90 Maka, [2005] EWCA (Crim) 3365, [3.3] (U.K.) (describing victim and beginning of exploitation). 
91 See id. (noting victim promised well paying job). 
92 See id. (recounting victim’s journey and explaining defendant’s systemic deprivation of her freedom). 
93 Calculated based on the average of last six months of 2004 dollar equivalent of 1.84. 
94 Maka, [2005] EWCA (Crim) 3365, [4] (U.K.). 
95 Id. 
96 Calculated based on the average of last six months of 2004 dollar equivalent of 1.84. 
97 See Maka, [2005] EWCA Crim 3365, [4] (U.K.).  
98 See id.  
99 See id. ¶ 1 (outlining procedural history). 
100 See id. ¶ 13 (emphasis added). 
101 See id. ¶¶ 13-14 (upholding the sentence, but not awarding damages). 
102 R v. Roci, Ismailaj, [2005] EWCA (Crim) 3404, [4]-[6] (U.K.) (appeal taken from Eng.) (detailing 
delivery of women into industry of sex exploitation).  
103 See id. ¶¶ 5-13 (chronicling police investigation and outcomes).   
104 See id. ¶¶ 78-10 (noting surveillance and trafficker conduct observed). 
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Sexual Offences Act 2003.105  The prison sentences ranged from three years to nine 
years.106  Damages were not assessed, even though the trial judge had evidence that the 
three defendants profited mightily from their exploitation of the four victims: £160,000 
($288,000) for Ismailaj, £87,000 ($156,600) for Roci, and £46,000 ($82,800)107 for a 
third gang member.108  Even though the defendants appealed their sentences, Lord Justice 
Rose reasoned that the prison terms should be severe, in order to contain a deterrent 
element.109  
D. Attorney-General’s Reference (nos. 129 and 132 of 2006) 
¶31 The defendants trafficked women from East Europe, Spain, and Malaysia for work 
as prostitutes in the UK.110  Not all earnings were confiscated from all women, and not all 
were held captive.111  Some had worked in prostitution in their home countries, and all 
were over the age of eighteen.112  The defendants were convicted of operating a 
sophisticated trafficking ring involving conspiracy to traffic for sexual exploitation, to 
control prostitution for gain, and to facilitate a breach of immigration law.113  Similar to R 
v. Roci, the apprehension of the criminals was the direct result of proactive police 
investigation, including electronic surveillance conducted between May and October 
2005.114  The trial judge sentenced the defendants to prison terms ranging from twelve 
months to 7.5 years.115  Even though there was evidence that the defendants generated 
profits of approximately £200,000 ($364,000) to £300,000 ($546,000)116 per claimant, no 
damages were assessed.117   
¶32 The judgment issued by Lord Chief Justice, in both Regina v. Delgado-Fernandez 
and Regina v. Zammit, was also remarkable as it was one of the first trafficking cases that 
resulted in a more lenient sentencing on appeal.  Appeals to lessen sentences were 
granted due to the supposed absence of coercion and deception by the defendants,118 
                                                 
105 Sexual Offences Act, 2003, c. 42, §§ 57-58 (U.K.); see Roci, Ismailaj, [2005] EWCA (Crim) 3404, [1], 
[3] (U.K.) (recounting procedural history); Sexual Offences Act, 2003, c. 42 §§ 57-8 (U.K.).  
106 See Roci, Ismailaj, [2005] EWCA (Crim) 3404, [1] (U.K.) (describing sentencing as excessive and 
reducing sentence to range from three to nine years). 
107 Figures calculated based on the average of November, 2003 through September, 2004 dollar equivalent 
of 1.80. 
108 See Roci, Ismailaj, [2005] EWCA (Crim) 3404, [14] (U.K.) (calculating profit earned from 
exploitation). 
109 Id. ¶ 19.  
110 See R. v. Delgado-Fernandez, R. v. Thanh Hue Thi, R. v. Zammit, [2007] EWCA (Crim) 762, [5-6] 
(U.K.) (appeal taken from Eng.). 
111 See id. ¶¶ 6, 20 (describing false pretense used to capture Malaysian victim). While the defendant 
captured, forcefully restrained, and exploited some women, others traveled with the intent of working as 
prostitutes.  Id. ¶ 15.  
112 See id.   
113 See id. ¶¶ 2, 13-19 (detailing counts and sentencing of defendants).   
114 Id. ¶¶ 8, 21-29; Maka, [2005] EWCA (Crim) 3365, [3] (U.K.); see supra notes 92, 93 and 
accompanying text (chronicling police investigation and outcomes); Delgado-Fernandez, [2007] EWCA 
(Crim) 762, [8]-[29] (U.K.) (detailing police surveillance operation). 
115 See R. v. Delgado-Fernandez and R v. Thi, [2007] EWCA Crim 762, [2], [17], [19]  (U.K.) (outlining 
defendant’s sentencing). 
116 Figures calculated based on the average 2005 dollar equivalent of 1.82. 
117 See R v. Delgado-Fernandez and R v. Thi, [2007] EWCA Crim 762 (U.K.) (discussing financial aspect 
of industry at length, noting financial gains made by defendants, but not assigning any damages). 
118 Id. ¶ 46. 
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despite the Attorney General’s arguments that the sentences were in fact too lenient given 
the large scale of the operation, which netted the appellants revenues of approximately £2 
million pounds!119  In addition, the prosecution argued that “there was strict and ruthless 
control, and in one case, coerced prostitution…” which “called for a deterrent 
sentence.”120 
¶33 The subjective issue of “coercion” permeated this case, as well as confusion over 
the term “trafficking” as a crime centered on immigration violations, as opposed to 
exploitation and slavery.  These same issues have crippled prosecutions and/or attenuated 
sentencing in many other human trafficking cases, not just in the UK.  The issue of 
coercion can be problematic, as some jurists argue for more direct physical coercion, 
while others recognize that coercion can take subtler forms, such as economic 
desperation, psychological coercion, or even socio-cultural factors.121  Overall, the 
judicial interpretation of coercion as relates to human trafficking in many countries have 
skewed towards being more restrictive than many real-world forms of coercion 
accommodate, despite the fact that the definition of “trafficking” set forth in Article 3 of 
the Palermo Protocol includes “other forms of coercion” besides physical force.122  Such 
definitional confusions provide space for criminals to continue to exploit trafficked slaves 
with impunity.      
E. AT v. Dulghieru 
¶34 Decided on February 19, 2009, this case is crucial in that it was the first in the UK 
to assess damages to the defendants for the crime of sex trafficking.123  The claimants 
were four Moldovan women in their twenties, trafficked to the UK by the defendants on 
the false promise of work as dancers.124  After arriving in the UK, they were held captive 
in a basement in the Earls Court area of London, raped, and told that their family 
members would be harmed if they did not engage in prostitution.125  The women were 
forced to have sex with up to forty men per day, without compensation, in order to pay 
back a “debt” of £20,000 ($37,000)126 each.127  Some of the forced prostitution occurred 
at the “Greek Street Brothel,” where other sex trafficking victims were exploited.128  This 
venue was known as “the Slaughter House” because of the violent and degrading sexual 
acts the women were forced to perform.129  The Court was able to determine that through 
                                                 
119 See id. ¶¶ 46, 50 (Attorney General submissions demonstrating the gravity of the operation).   
120 Id. ¶ 50 (emphasis added).   
121 See Sarah Conly, Seduction, Rape, and Coercion, 115 ETHICS 96, 96-121 (Oct. 2004) (discussing issue 
of coercion with regard to sexual exploitation). 
122 See Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, especially Women and Children, 
supplementing United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, G.A. Res. 55/25, art. 3, 
U.N. Doc. A/RES/55/25 (Nov. 15, 2000) [hereinafter Palermo Protocol]. 
123 See Dulghieru, [2009] EWHC 225, [76] (U.K.) (awarding damages to defendants jointly and severally). 
124 See id. ¶¶ 1, 4 (describing false pretenses traffickers used to lure women). 
125 See id. ¶¶ 6-7 (using isolation, forcible restraint, threats of harm to force compliance with trafficker 
commands). 
126 All figures in this section calculated based on the average 2008 dollar equivalent of 1.85. 
127 See id. ¶ 8 (explaining debt bondage used by traffickers to give women hope of paying debt and 
escaping sex industry).   
128 See id. ¶ 14 (portraying horrifying exploitation one particular victim had to endure on weekly basis- 
“Greek Street”).  
129 See id. ¶ 15 (citing “Slaughter House” name attributable to the extreme verbal and physical abuse girls 
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this exploitation, the defendants generated profits of approximately £786,000 
($1,454,100).130      
¶35 In addition to the maximum prison term for each of the defendants, Treacy J held 
that damages be paid by the defendants to the claimants, stating “…the Defendants’ 
conduct was so appalling, so malevolent, and so utterly contemptuous of the Claimant’s 
rights as to amount to exceptional conduct warranting an award of aggravated 
damages…”131  Aggravated and exemplary damages totaling £175,000, £162,000, 
£142,000, and £132,000 (£611,000 total) ($1,130,350 total) were awarded to each 
defendant respectively.132  Damages awarded through the Criminal Injuries 
Compensation Authority were to supplement these.133  By finally imposing a financial 
penalty for sex slave exploitation, this case directly recognized the economic essence of 
sex trafficking crimes and responded to the immense profits enjoyed by sex slave 
exploiters with a penalty intended to be both retributive and deterrent, by directly 
negating the financial benefit of the offense.   
¶36 Focusing on this important shift in UK human trafficking jurisprudence, occurring 
almost six years after the passage of the Sexual Offenses Act 2003, the following 
recommendations are intended to optimize the deterrent impact of sex trafficking 
penalties, guided by the principle that the most effective way to eradicate such crimes is 
to elevate the costs and risks associated with the crimes.  These recommendations are 
simultaneously presented as a minimal threshold required by Member States to meet the 
positive obligation to penalize effectively human traffickers under Article 4 ECHR.  
While focused on sex trafficking, the same logic in these recommendations would apply 
to the design of laws against most other forms of slavery. 
F. Recommendations for Anti-trafficking Policy and Legislation in the UK 
¶37 Recommendations for improved policy and legislative responses to sex trafficking 
center on elevating the real risks and costs associated with the crime, commensurate with 
the deterrent and retributive aims of UK criminal law.  The following recommendations 
focus on three main areas of policy and legislative improvement in order to do so: 1) 
sentencing guidelines, 2) law enforcement, and 3) survivor protections.  
1. Sentencing Guidelines 
¶38 Recalling the focus on deterrence and retribution in UK criminal law set forth in 
section 142 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003, as well as the oft-repeated motivation 
among judges in sex trafficking cases for sentences that achieve a deterrent purpose, it is 
essential that damages and other economic penalties be elevated for the crime of sex 
trafficking.134  The primary question to consider is: what is a deterrent level of economic 
                                                                                                                                                 
endured). 
130 Id. ¶ 69. 
131 Id. ¶ 62. 
132 See id. ¶ 76 (assigning damages to individual defendants, but maintaining all jointly and severally 
liable).  
133 See id. ¶¶ 53-54 (reasoning such damages barely scratch surface of compensating for injuries suffered 
by girls).  
134 See Criminal Justice and Court Services Act, 2000, c. 43 (U.K). 
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penalty?135  A 2009 UK House of Commons Report indicated that sex traffickers earn 
between £500 and £1,000 pounds ($780 to $1,560)136 per victim per week.137  My 
calculations show that sex slave exploiters can easily generate profits of £50,000 to 
£60,000, ($78,000 to $93,600) per slave per year.  Sex slave exploiters who exploit 
multiple slaves for multiple years can generate profits in excess of one million pounds, as 
seen in some of the cases discussed above.  Penalties for the exploitation of humans as 
trafficked sex slaves that solely provide prison terms or anemic financial penalties cannot 
serve as an adequate deterrent to the crime.  How then, does one assess a deterrent level 
of economic penalty?   
¶39 In Sex Trafficking, I introduced a metric called the Exploitation Value (EV) of each 
type of slave, as a means to guide the design of economic penalties in the law for such 
crimes.138  This unfortunate economic term is not intended to overlook the intense human 
cost of slave-related crimes, but rather to provide an analytical framework to establish 
penalties that meet the deterrent and retributive aims of criminal laws regulating 
economic crimes, such as human trafficking and slavery.139  The EV thus captures the 
total economic value that a slave exploiter can expect to enjoy after having acquired a 
slave, before that slave either escapes, is freed, or perishes.140  By my calculation, the EV 
of trafficked sex slaves in the UK range from £100,000 to £120,000 ($156,000 to 
$187,200) per slave.  These numbers have been calculated very conservatively and could 
easily be much higher.141  Nevertheless, the real penalty associated with the crime of sex 
trafficking should be in the vicinity of these amounts, if not more, in order to be 
sufficiently deterrent, if not to render the commission of such crimes economically 
unfeasible.   
                                                 
135 There are other punitive measures other than economic penalty that can provide deterrence against slave 
offenders, especially for sex trafficking crimes, such as public shaming of consumers of commercial sex 
services from trafficked sex slaves. See KARA, supra note 23, at 1-43 (reviewing dynamic of supply of and 
demand for sexual exploitation, particularly as it relates to consumer demand).  
136 All figures in this section calculated based on the average of 2009 dollar equivalent of 1.56. 
137 UK HOUSE OF COMMONS, THE TRADE IN HUMAN BEINGS: HUMAN TRAFFICKING IN THE UK 
CONVENTIONS, PROTOCOLS, AND TREATIES, 2009, H.C, 23-1, at 3 (detailing key facts regarding sex 
trafficking, noting average income of sex trafficker).  
138 See KARA, supra note 23, at 224-26 (providing Exploitation Value of a sex slaves in brothels).  
139 These crimes are of course gross human rights violations predicated on abuse, humiliation, racism, 
sexism, violence, and other aberrant qualities, but slavery is fundamentally a crime predicated on the 
manifestation of these qualities for the purpose of extracting economic benefit.  Slavery is concerned with 
maximizing profit by minimizing or eliminating the cost of labor, and those involved in this practice 
typically do so through the expression of the aberrant qualities listed above. See KARA, supra note 23, at 
16-41 (explaining business of sex slavery, economics of sex slavery, and the continued growth and success 
of human sexual exploitation).  
140 See id. at 200-19, 224-26 (detailing logic and calculation of Exploitation Values for slave exploitation).  
In brief, the metric is derived by calculating the monthly net profit generated by the exploitation of a 
trafficked sex slave in the UK, multiplied by the weighted average duration of enslavement of a trafficked 
sex slave in the UK (thirty months by my calculation), discounted back to a net present value by applying a 
discount factor that accounts for the time value of money and the risk of future cash flows (I apply a hefty 
25% discount rate).  Id. 
141 Some of the assumptions that lead to very conservative calculations include, but are not limited to: 
heavy discounting of the rate of daily commercial sex transactions, increases in basic operating expenses, 
decreases in the calculated weighted average duration of enslavement, and increases in average acquisition 
costs of trafficked sex slaves—all as compared to actual data gathered by the author.  Also, the discount 
rate used in the EV calculations has been assumed high. 
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¶40 The importance of the term “real” cannot be overstated.  In Economics, the term 
“real” has various uses and typically indicates the value of something after it has been 
adjusted for inflation or probability.  With probability, the value is typically an outcome 
and the real value indicates the value of the outcome multiplied by the probability the 
outcome will occur.  The “real penalty” then, can be defined as: maximum financial 
penalty in the law * probability of being prosecuted * probability of being convicted.142  
Maximizing this formula requires the design and deployment of tactics that elevate 
prosecution and conviction probabilities (rendering them more effective), as well as a 
sufficiently severe level of economic penalty upon conviction.  Achieving these elevated 
economic penalties in the law is probably the easiest facet to accomplish, as elevated 
prosecution and conviction probabilities necessitate a host of systemic alterations and 
enhanced resource deployment to combat human trafficking crimes around the world.  
For example, in Sex Trafficking, I discussed how the use of fast-track courts with 
international observers and judicial review; fully-funded victim-witness protection 
programs including comprehensive medical, psychological, educational and vocational 
services; and livable income for the duration of a trial and up to one year after, elevated 
salaries for prosecutors and judges in developing nations, as well as elevated law 
enforcement investigation by an elite antislavery intervention force (more on this below) 
will serve as key tactical responses that can address the primary obstacles to more 
effective prosecutions and convictions of slave-related crimes.143  Ultimately, these 
elevated probabilities must be multiplied against elevated penalties in order to effect a 
real cost that renders a sex trafficking operation minimally profitable or unprofitable.  
Accomplishing this aim, I believe, is what should be considered effective penalization of 
trafficking and slavery offenders.  Understanding the EV of each type of human 
enslavement can therefore help with the assessment of the level of economic penalty 
required to achieve sufficient deterrence, and as a result, effective penalization under 
Article 4 of the ECHR.   
¶41 A hypothetical example clarifies this proposition.  Assume that the maximum 
statutory penalty for sex trafficking in the UK were £100,000 and the probability of being 
prosecuted in any given year for the offence were 2% (one in fifty acts of sex trafficking 
in a year are prosecuted) and the probability of being convicted were 33% (one in three 
prosecutions results in a conviction).   In this scenario, the real penalty would be £660, or 
less than 1% of the calculated EV, which is the expected economic benefit of the 
commission of the crime.  Would such a real penalty qualify as retributive or deterrent?  
In fact, such a low real penalty appears enticing to criminal offenders around the world 
who have taken up the business of sex trafficking as a way to generate hundreds of 
thousands of pounds in profit, at almost no real risk.  The current prosecution and 
conviction probabilities relating to sex trafficking crimes in the UK (as with most 
countries) are well below the estimates in this example, rendering the real penalty for the 
commission of the crime of sex trafficking virtually nil.144  This fact, above all, is what 
                                                 
142 This formula assumes the prosecution and conviction probabilities are independent, though it could be 
argued that any number of real world conditions might render them dependent.  Though more complex to 
calculate, the result is not materially different in relation to the arguments being made. 
143 It is worth noting that the ECHR gave priority treatment to the Rantsev case, similar to the “fast-track 
court” process I have suggested.   
144 See KARA, supra note 23, at 208-209 (providing detail on probabilities of prosecution and conviction 
for sex trafficking offences in several countries).  
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drives, I argue, the rational criminal agent to be highly interested in this offence.  
Elevating the maximum financial penalty stipulated in the law (along with restitution 
payments, asset forfeiture, money tracing, and other measures) is a first step towards 
elevating the real penalty for sex trafficking to a deterrent and retributive level.  In 
addition, more aggressive, fully-resourced, proactive, and strategic law enforcement and 
enhanced survivor care are also required, as will be discussed below. 
¶42 This discussion warrants one final point relating to this theoretical discussion of 
real risk.  Recall the statement from the 1990 Home Office Report that the perception of 
a high probability of arrest and conviction serves as a deterrent to would-be offenders.145  
The perception of a real cost and risk associated with an offense that renders the potential 
advantage of the commission of the offense “not worth the risk” would also serve as a 
sufficient deterrent to would-be offenders.  If an offender perceived a combined 10% 
change of being prosecuted and convicted of a sex trafficking crime, and the maximum 
penalty for doing so was £1 million, the perceived real cost of £100,000 per infraction 
would not only negate the expected gain of the commission of the crime, but it would 
render any such commission that is momentarily successful economically untenable.  
Add to this, additional penalties associated with the need for reparation to victims as set 
forth in section 142(e) Criminal Justice Act 2003, and the real penalty would exceed any 
perceived gain associated with exploiting sex slaves.146  Subsequently, incapacitating an 
individual for ten or twenty years in prison serves as the punitive icing on the cake, as 
opposed to the prime source of potential deterrence and retribution. 
¶43 One might argue that most criminals are opportunists who do not think in such 
detailed economic terms.  However, most criminals, like the rest of society, are rational 
economic agents, and the business acumen of the average sex trafficker in particular is 
highly sophisticated, and where a virtually risk and cost-free system of human 
exploitation persists, those same criminals have flocked across the last two decades to 
exploit the opportunities presented by a very compelling and profitable business 
opportunity.  Sex slave operations only have three costs that can be attacked: 1) fixed 
costs (setting up a brothel, acquiring new slaves), 2) operating costs (everything from 
food, beverage, rent, and bribes), and 3) the cost of being caught.  Little can be done to 
create an upward shock in the first two cost categories in order to render the crime of sex 
trafficking economically untenable.  By my calculation, the 2010 weighted average 
global cost of a trafficked sex slave is approximately $1,900 (closer to $6,000 in the 
UK),147 and operating costs such as food and bribes are nominal.  To make the crime 
economically untenable requires the creation of an upward shock in the cost of risk,148 
and beyond higher penalties, real risk also requires elevated prosecution and conviction 
                                                 
145 See ALLEN, supra note 39 and accompanying text (discussing perception of conviction affecting 
criminal risk aversion). 
146 Criminal Justice and Court Services Act, 2000, c. 43, §142(e) (U.K.). 
147 See KARA, supra note 23, at 20 (calculating sex trafficking specific slave-trading revenue and profits for 
2007).  
148 Any slave exploiter can respond to upward price shocks by passing on some or all of the cost to the 
consumer by elevating retail price, however, since my research revealed that commercial sex from 
trafficked sex slaves is a highly elastic product, such a tactic would result in a greater-than-linear reduction 
in consumer demand, which will perforce result in a reduction in slave owner demand for more sex slaves.  
This price elasticity point is discussed in detail in chapters one and eight of Sex Trafficking. See id. at 1-44, 
200-19 (discussing price elasticity with respect to global sex trafficking industry and overarching economic 
framework).   
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rates, which can only begin with a more aggressive, fully-funded, and strategic law 
enforcement response to sex trafficking crimes. 
2. Law Enforcement 
¶44 To make statutory penalties for a crime truly deterrent, criminals must be 
convicted.  Convictions are dependent on prosecutions, and prosecutions are dependent 
on a high level of effective police enforcement.  For this reason, the Court in Rantsev 
specified that States have procedural obligations to investigate situations of potential 
trafficking in a proactive and prompt fashion.  To do so implies sufficient law 
enforcement focus on such crimes, proactively tasked with top-of-the line techniques, 
technology, and resources to investigate trafficking crimes that otherwise thrive in the 
shadows of cities around the world. 
¶45 At present, law enforcement activity in the UK, as in all nations, to investigate and 
intervene in the crimes of sex trafficking is insufficient.  Even though the Home Office 
estimated there were more than 4,000 victims of human trafficking in the UK in 2003, 
there have been little more than ten or twelve cases prosecuted per year since the passage 
of the Sexual Offences Act 2003, representing at most approximately 2% of the total 
number of victims.149  If you ask the average criminal: you have at most a 2% chance 
each year of being prosecuted for a crime through which you could otherwise generate 
hundreds of thousands of pounds in profits, would you be likely to engage in it?  The 
answer will likely be affirmative.  Interestingly, the level of cases being prosecuted for 
human trafficking cases directly increased in the UK during 2006 and 2007 concurrent 
with an elevation in the level of proactive law enforcement investigation.  The chief such 
investigations were called “Operation Pentameter 1” and “Operation Pentameter 2.”    
The first operation, launched in 2006, rescued 88 sex trafficking victims and led to 232 
arrests.150  Pentameter 2, launched on October 3, 2007, led to 167 victims rescued and 
528 arrests.151  Proactive investigations such as these directly liberate victims, abort 
future cash flows generated by the exploitation of the victims, and help elevate the real 
penalties associated with the commission of slave-related crimes, and they should be 
construed as a minimal threshold to meet the procedural obligations under Article 4 
ECHR.   
¶46 While temporarily better under the Pentameter Operations the current level of 
intervention in the UK suffered a major blow when the Human Trafficking Unit of UK 
Metropolitan Police Service was shut down on April 1, 2010 due to budget cuts.152  
Despite the best efforts of the head of the Team, Detective Inspector Stephen Wilkinson, 
to argue against the closure of his unit, the UK sent a strong signal that human trafficking 
is not a law enforcement (or human rights) priority.  Even the UK House of Commons 
stated in its most recent human trafficking report that it was “concerned to learn that the 
Home Office had decided to cease funding for the Metropolitan’s Human Trafficking 
                                                 
149 HOME OFF. & SCOTTISH EXECUTIVE, supra note 56.  
150 Id. 
151 Id. (discussing Pentameter 1 statistics); PoliceOracle.com, Police News, Pentameter Facts and Figures, 
http://www.policeoracle.com/news/Pentameter-Facts-and-Figures_16691.html (last visited May 26, 2010) 
(detailing Pentameter 2 statistics).  
152 See supra note 131 and accompanying text; Emily Dugan, Police Team that Investigated Tide of Human 
Traffic is Closed, THE INDEPENDENT (UK), Nov. 10, 2008.  
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unit,” and it strongly encouraged the Home Office to continue funding for 2010 and 
beyond.153   Trafficking thrives in the shadows, and the UK’s top law enforcement team 
dedicated to shining a light on that crime was extinguished, sending a clear signal to 
traffickers and slave exploiters around the world that the UK is open for business.  
Hopefully, litigation under the precedents established in Rantsev intended to reverse this 
decision will be forthcoming.     
3. Survivor Protections  
¶47 A third element of an effective response to contemporary slavery crimes is elicited 
by the following question—if there were 760 arrests in the Pentameter operations alone, 
why have there only been a dozen or so human trafficking prosecutions per year in the 
UK since 2004?  Part of the answer is that each case may have multiple defendants, but 
the deeper answer is that most human trafficking arrests in the UK, as with most nations, 
do not proceed to the prosecution stage because of, inter alia, insufficient protections for 
survivors who are required to testify against their exploiters.  In order to protect 
individuals and adequately prosecute offenders, a much more comprehensive and fully 
resourced human rights response to survivor care and protection is required.154  Even with 
adequate care, threats against survivors and their families by slave exploiters often 
terrorize individuals against testifying.  Finally, most survivors cannot sit idly for one or 
two years as a court case runs its course, as they are typically desperate for income, 
which is often the condition that first led them to being trafficked.  All countries must 
elevate human rights protections for human trafficking survivors—no matter how they 
arrived in the country—including additional funding for shelters, as well as livable 
incomes to the survivors and/or their families for the duration of a trial and up to twelve 
months after.  These human rights protections begin with the presumption that the 
individual is a victim, as opposed to an offender who has violated migration or anti-
prostitution laws, which often results in the individual’s deportation, which of course 
prevents any prosecution since there is no witness available to testify.  Fast-track courts 
dedicated to trafficking crimes and other careful human rights measures can further help 
promote far more effective prosecution and conviction rates against human trafficking 
crimes.   
VI. CONCLUSION 
¶48 Slavery is illegal on every inch of planet Earth, yet the design of laws and 
interventions against modern-day slavery falls well short of being effective.  In the case 
of Rantsev v. Cyprus and Russia, the European Court of Human Rights clarified that 
human trafficking is a violation of Article 4 of the ECHR and called for more substantive 
positive and procedural obligations to States vis-à-vis effective protection of individuals 
                                                 
153 See UK HOUSE OF COMMONS, supra note 137, at 34.  
154 It should be noted that victims of human trafficking should also be encouraged to file civil claims 
against their offenders, where jurisdictions allow.  Such claims can help provide a better result for the 
claimant, particularly due to the lower evidentiary burden and the greater focus on damages as a remedy, 
which are far more useful to a victim of human trafficking than solely sending the offender to prison and/or 
providing anemic economic penalties or restitution.  NGO’s play a crucial role in this area from the 
standpoint of advising victims of their rights and options relating to both criminal and civil law claims.   
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against trafficking, investigation into trafficking crimes, and prosecution and penalization 
of offenders.  This paper provides analytical guidelines for achieving these ends, with a 
focus on designing more effective penalties against human trafficking.  Effectiveness 
itself was defined as the achievement of sufficient deterrence and retribution under the 
current criminal law mandates in the UK.  An elevated penalty regime will help erode the 
robust economic benefits associated with most human trafficking offenses.  Combined 
with measures designed to increase the efficacy of investigation, prosecution, and 
conviction rates of trafficking crimes, an adequately designed penalty regime should 
result in the elevation of the costs and risks associated with the crime of human 
trafficking to a sufficiently deterrent level.  This should be the minimal requirement to 
meet positive and procedural obligations for penalization under Article 4 ECHR under 
Rantsev.    
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VII. APPENDIX - REFERENCE TABLES: TRAFFICKED SEX SLAVE ECONOMICS 
All figures in 2009 Pounds Sterling 
 
A. Club-Brothel Economics 
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B. Apartment Brothel Economics 
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C. Street Prostitution Economics 
 
 
